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12

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
PRIORITY AMMAN
TELNO 167

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
20 APRIL 1970

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TOP COPY

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 167 DATED 20 APRIL 70.
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT CAIRO UKMIS NEW YORK
TEL AVIV WASHINGTON TRIPOLI MOD DIA JISNE.
SAVING TO BAHGDAD JEDDA KUWAIT PARIS MOSCOW.



JORDAN : CABINET CHANGES.

THE FORMATION OF A NEW CABINET WAS ANNOUNCED LAST NIGHT.
FIVE OF THE MINISTERS ARE NEW AND THE OTHERS REMAIN UNCHANGED.
THE NEW CABINET IS COMPOSED AS FOLLOWS:-

per
am
2x/7

BAHJAT TALHOUNI - PRIME MINISTER.

ABDUL MUNEM RIFAI - DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS.

AHMAD TOUQAN - DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER.

SHEIKH ABDULLAH GHOSHEH - MINISTER OF ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

SALAH MOUASHER - MINISTER OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS. (NEW APPOINTMENT).

SAMI JUDEH - MINISTER OF NATIONAL ECONOMY.

DR. SUBHI AMIN AMR - MINISTER OF TRANSPORT, RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT.

SALAH ABU ZEID - MINISTER OF CULTURE, INFORMATION, TOURISM AND
ANTIQUITIES.

DHOUQAN HINDAWI - MINISTER OF EDUCATION.

SAMI AYOUB - MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE.

DR. ABDUL SALAM MAJALI - MINISTER OF HEALTH.

MAJ.GEN. RASHID AREIQAT - MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS

DR. JAMAL NASSER - MINISTER OF JUSTICE.

LIEUT. GEN. ALI HIARI - MINISTER OF DEFENCE. (NEW APPOINTMENT).

WASFI ANABTAWI - MINISTER OF FINANCE. (NEW APPOINTMENT).

NAJIB IRSHAI DAT - MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR. (NEW APPOINTMENT).

NADIM AL-ZARU - MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR (MUNICIPAL AND RURAL
AFFAIRS). (NEW APPOINTMENT).

2.. IN ADDITION, MASHHOUR HADITHA AL - JAZI HAS BEEN APPOINTED
CHIEF OF STAFF, REPLACING LIEUT. GEN. ALI HIARI, AND MAJ. GEN.
ZAHIR MATAR HAS BEEN APPOINTED DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SECURITY,
REPLACING LIEUT. GEN. 'AZZA QANDUR, WHO HAS BEEN RETIRED.

3. THE FOLLOWING MINISTERS ARE NO LONGER IN OFFICE:-

YACoub MU'AMMAR (FINANCE).

MUSA ABUL RAGHEB (MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR).

BURHAN KAMAL (COMMUNICATIONS).

FCO PASS PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

AND SAVING TO BAGHDAD, JEDDA, KUWAIT, PARIS, AND MOSCOW.

EMILE AL GHOURI (Sir P. Adams)

SIR P. ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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2

CYPHER CAT A
PRIORITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 169

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
20 APRIL 1970

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 21 APR 1970 INFORMATION NEJ 1/4

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 169 DATED 20/4 REPEATED FOR
TO CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON, TRIPOLI, MOD DI4, JISNE. AND SAVING TO BAGHDAD
AND JERUSALEM

MY TEL NO 167: JORDAN INTERNAL.

IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE NEW CABINET WILL BE EVEN
MARGINALLY MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE LAST, FOR CLEARLY KING
HUSSEIN HAS TOTALLY FAILED TO RESOLVE THE DILEMMA REFERRED
TO IN PARA 3 OF MY TEL NO 163.

2. IN TAKING THIS ACTION THE KING PROBABLY HAD TWO OBJECTIVES
IN MIND: FIRST TO PUT AN END TO DEMORALISING SPECULATION ABOUT
THE IMMINENT DEMISE OF THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT AND SECOND TO
RETRIEVE HIS LOSS OF PRESTIGE OVER THE SISCO DEMONSTRATION,
WITHOUT PROVOKING A FURTHER FEDAYEEN CONFRONTATION.

3. THUS HE HAS EXPRESSED HIS DISPLEASURE WITH THE BEHAVIOUR
OF THE AMERICANS, THE ARMY AND THE POLICE BY RESPECTIVELY HAVING
THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR RECALLED, THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF
KICKED UPSTAIRS AND THE CHIEF OF SECURITY RETIRED. AT THE SAME
TIME, TO SHOW THAT HE IS NOT INTIMIDATED BY THE FEDAYEEN, HE
HAS RETAINED THE PRIME MINISTER AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS, AND
PERHAPS MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION, WHO
WAS PUBLICLY ATTACKED BY FEDAYEEN SPOKESMEN LAST FEBRUARY.
HOWEVER, HE HAS APPOINTED AS THE NEW CHIEF OF STAFF, IN MAJOR
GENERAL MASHHOUR HADITHA AL-JAZI, THE MOST POPULAR AND ABLE
AMONG THE SENIOR BEDOUIN OFFICERS, AND A MAN, MOREOVER, WHO IS
BELIEVED TO BE ON GOOD TERMS WITH THE FATAH LEADER-SHIP,

/AND

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-2-

AND IS AN OUTSPOKEN CRITIC OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, SHERIF NASSER,. (IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE HOW THESE TWO RUB ALONG TOGETHER AND ALSO HOW RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE DEVELOP.

4. THE NEW SECURITY CHIEF IS A TOUGH AND RELIABLE PROFESSIONAL, OVER WHOM HIS NEW TITULAR MASTER, THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, AN EAST BANKER AND FORMER PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, IS UNLIKELY TO HAVE MUCH POWER.

5. ALL IN ALL, THE DISCREDITED MIXTURE MUCH AS BEFORE, IS PERHAPS RATHER LESS LIKELY TO PROVOKE A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE FEDAYEEN.

DEFCONCEN PASS TO MOD DI4 AND JISNE

FCO PASS TO DEFCONCEN, PARIS, MOSCOW, NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO BAGHDAD AND JERUSALEM

SIR P ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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MOD INTERNAL

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
AMMAN.

24 April, 1970.

Dear Long,

New Jordanian Government

We have now been able to gather a little more information about the new Ministers to add to that contained in our telegram No. 169 of 20 April.

2. Of the east bankers, Saleh Mouasher, the new Minister of Social Affairs, is a member of a wealthy Christian family. He is a farmer and a very close friend of Suleiman Nabulsi, Chairman of the Jordan Soviet Friendship Society and a kind of left wing elder statesman. Mouasher served as Minister of Health in Nabulsi's Government but has not been prominent since then. I am afraid that we know less about Irsheidat, the new Minister of the Interior who is a native of Irbid from the north and was recently Governor of Amman.

3. Of the two Palestinians, Nadim Zaru, the former Mayor of Ramallah, did not know of his appointment until it was announced - he was apparently in Beirut at the time. Zaru is closely connected with the PLO, and after consulting with them, told Talhouni that he could not serve as a member of his Government. Wasfi Anabtawi, the new Minister of Finance was born in 1903, served as a Senior Education Officer in Palestine during the mandate and subsequently became a University Professor. As a former member of the Palestine Civil Service, he receives a pension of JD 400 a year and is one of the pensioners paid direct by this Embassy. He, therefore, did not benefit from H.M.Gs recent decision to cancel out the effects of devaluation.

4. To the limited extent that Cabinet appointments are significant, therefore, the choice of the new Ministers represented an attempt by the King to create a small opening towards the left and the Fedayeen, which has failed as far as the Fedayeen are concerned as a result of Zaru's resignation.

4. But quite apart from the fact that the Talhuni administration is widely regarded in Jordan as corrupt and incompetent, the fact that all major political decisions are known to be taken by the King, with little or no consultation of his cabinet, makes it inevitable that no aspiring Palestinian politician, still less one with any claim to represent Palestinian nationalism would wish to join a cabinet which is popularly believed to comprise (with one or two exceptions) an uninspiring mixture of worthy nonentities and corrupt self seekers.

Yours ever,
(C. D. Lush) C.D. Lush

C. W. Long, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.,

EN CLAIR
ROUTINE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 172

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
21 APRIL 1970

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 21 APR 1970 NEJ 1/4
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TO BEIRUT CAIRO UKMIS NEW YORK TEL AVIV WASHINGTON TRIPOLI
MOD DI4 AND JISNE. AND SAVING TO BAGHDAD JEDDAH KUWAIT PARIS
AND MOSCOW.

OUR TEL 167 OF 20 APRIL: JORDAN: CABINET CHANGES.

PLEASE ADD THE NAME EMILE AL GHORI (SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND LABOUR)
TO PARA 3 OF TEL UNDER REFERENCE.

ERROR REGRETTED.

FCO PASS ROUTINE NEW YORK WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO BAGDAD
JEDDAH KUWAIT PARIS AND MOSCOW

SIR P ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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M.O.D.(INT.)

DDDDD

~~Copy also on~~
~~NEJ 1/5~~

30th April, 1970.

Visit of Jordanian Clerks to Westminster

Ten days' ago I had a letter from Asfour; it was dated March 10th but I think in reality it must have been written on April 10th because it came by air mail. I enclose a copy of it. I wrote to him by return of post and I enclose a copy of this letter as well. You will also have seen the letter which Mr. Holland, our Librarian, sent to Asfour on 23rd April.

I do not need to tell you how eager I am to help the Jordanian Parliament in every way I can but I am a little worried lest I am, quite inadvertently, "bounced" into having Jordanian Clerks landing on my doorstep without being able to make appropriate arrangements. For example, I had no idea at all, certainly no one had told me that Nami Khair was intending to come to London in June. As it so happens I have a very busy month with Clerks from Korea, Germany and now the Speaker from Kenya coming as well as those who have been with me since April. Quite frankly it is not at all a convenient time to have Khair but, as you will have seen from my letter to Asfour, I don't want to say no.

I think that if this exchange scheme is to be a success I must know in advance when people are coming. In practice I know that I cannot rely upon the Jordan Parliament because I realise that they don't think as we do in times of time. Therefore my only source of information is you and since the money for such visits comes, I presume, from the British Council, you will be able to exercise a control over the timing of such visits. I realise that you should not have to be bothered by this yourself but I see no other way to avoid what I am very anxious to avoid, namely an unavoidable refusal by us to take people because they are

intending to come at short notice.

Do let me know what you think and what suggestions you would like to make. If I have to have Khair I will do what I can but I cannot promise at this short notice to give him a very full programme.

Best wishes and I hope your wife and son are well.

Yours sincerely,

M. H. LAWRENCE
Clerk of the Overseas Office

E. T. H. Fitzsimmons, Esq., M.B.E.,
The British Council,
P.O. Box 634,
Jebel,
Amman,
Jordan.



01-930 6240, Extns. 724 & 1114

K213 of despatch
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OVERSEAS OFFICE Mr Long
HOUSE OF COMMONS A.E.D.

4

Mr
Long
17/5

30 April '70

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NEW 1/4

Dear Jordan.

I should be very grateful
if this letter to Fitzsimmons of
the British Council, Jordan, could
be sent to Amman through
the Bag.

For obvious reasons, as I'm
sure you will agree, it would
be unwise to send it by
ordinary post. I attach

Copy of the letter & leave
the envelope unsealed for you
to see the contents.

Yours sincerely
Michael.

P.S. An Air Mail label
was put on by mistake

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Near Eastern Department

(5)

NEJ 1/L

4 May, 1970

pm
5/5

Jordan Parliament

I enclose for your information a copy of a letter from Lawrence of the Overseas Office, House of Commons, to Fitzsimons at the British Council. We are forwarding the original to Fitzsimons by this bag.

(C. . Long)

C. W. Carter Esq.,
Amman.

SECRET

6



Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

7 May, 1970

(NEJ.1/4)

pr
cum
8/5

The Outlook for Jordan

...

I enclose a copy of a draft paper put together by Peter Summerscale. Peter has asked to forward it to you for any observations you may have, and to say that it has no particularly advanced status as yet; so do please comment as freely as you would like. There is some urgency on this, in that we hope to take it a stage further early in the week beginning 18 May; so if you could send your reactions by next week's bag (or by telegram over that weekend) it would be most helpful.

(C. W. Long)

C. D. Lush Esq.,
AMMAN

c.c. P.W.Summerscale Esq.
Cabinet Office Assessments Staff.

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CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM NO 192

TO EGYPTIAN AND COAST GUARD OFFICE
11 MAY 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 192 DATED 11/5 REPEATED FOR
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(NEJ 3/30x/1 f8)

M.P.I.P.T.: KING HUSSEIN.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
12 MAY 1970
NEJ 1/14

from 14/5

KING HUSSEIN TOOK A FAIRLY RELAXED VIEW OF THE INTERNAL SITUATION. HE SAID THAT, AS I WOULD KNOW HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE INCREASING ACTIVITY OF LEFT-WINGERS IN JORDAN BOTH WITHIN THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND OUTSIDE IT. BUT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE ALIVE TO THE DANGERS AND THE MODERATE FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP, EXEMPLIFIED BY ARAFAT, WERE PERHAPS EVEN MORE SO. THE KING'S CURRENT CONCERN WAS TO ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT PLAYED AS EFFECTIVE A ROLE IN OPPOSING EXTREMISTS AS DID ARAFAT. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MODERATE FEDAYEEN WERE IN EFFECT NOW COMPLETELY ALIGNED ON THIS AND WERE COOPERATING IN ACTION AGAINST THE EXTREMISTS.

2. COMMENTING ON THE INCREASED ACTIVITY OF THE SOVIET AND OTHER COMMUNIST MISSIONS IN AMMAN, THE KING SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE LEMIN CENTENARY CELEBRATIONS HAD BEEN OVERTONE AND WERE WIDELY REJECTED BY JORDANIANS. HE THOUGHT THE NET RESULT WAS A LOSS TO THE LEFT - WINGERS.

3. ON SUCH EVIDENCE AS IS AVAILABLE TO US WE ARE INCLINED TO DOUBT THIS ASSESSMENT. BUT WE HAVE OTHER INDICATIONS TO SHOW THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND MODERATE FEDAYEEN ARE IN FACT CO-OPERATING AGAINST THE EXTREMISTS.

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO UKNIS NEW YORK.

SIR P ADAMS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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Mr. Summerscale &
Mrs. Elwell. I.R.D.
21 1975

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NEJ 1/14

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Pl. pwr on
Jordan internal

Mr. Log. 12/5 (8)

pa
17/5

Apologies for failing
to pass this on to you
at the proper time.

From
12/5

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
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JORDAN:GOVT SHUFFLE



INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF QUOTE SOMEWHAT MORE PRONOUNCED PRO-FEDAYIN
ORIENTATION UNQUOTE BASED ON

(A)APPOINTMENT OF TWO WEST BANK DEPORTEES, ZARU AND ANABTANI, TO CA-
BINET. (WEEKEND PRESS REPORTS HOWEVER ZARU, ALLEGED BY CONTACT HERE
TO BE FAIAN MEMBER, HAS SINCE EITHER DECLINED TO TAKE UP POST OR
RESIGNED).

(B)RETENTION OF FORMER C OF S ALI HAYARI IN PROMINENT POST. ALTHOUGH
HAYARI'S MOVE TO DEFENCE PORTFOLIO MAY BE ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE HIM
BELIEVE IT IS INTERESTING HE WAS NOT/NOT DROPPED; (C)APPOINTMENT AS
NEW C OF S OF OFFICER REPORTED HERE TO BE ON GOOD TERMS WITH FEDAYIN;
(D)BEIRUT PRESS CONSENSUS.


FAILURE OF FORMER INTERIOR MIN RASSOUL KAYLANI TO REAPPEAR AND
RETIEMENT OF INTERNAL SECURITY DIR IZZAT KHALIL (ONE TIME DEPUTY
OF KAYLANI) ALSO COLOURED OUR THINKING.

2. IF WE HAD HAD AN ASSESSMENT DIFFERENT FROM OURS INTERESTED TO LEARN
ON WHAT POINTS. ZARU'S REGISTRATION IS PROMPTING US TO REASSESS SI-
TUTIONAL CONVEYATIONS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY HAD WITH AM. S. WERE SUGGEST
MAY BE PLAYING THE ROLE OF A MAN'S GESTURES DESIGNED
TO PRESENT PRO-FEDAYIN ELEMENTS WITHOUT GIVING ANYTHING OF IMPORTANCE
AWAY.

It has
not
much

SECRET

9



BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

15 May, 1970

Dear Harry,

Many thanks for sending us a copy of Peter Summerscale's draft paper "Outlook for Jordan", which struck me as a notable piece of work.

2. I attach some hastily drafted seriatim comments, for whose length I apologise. No doubt the very short notice you were able to give us to comment on a major paper on our territory was unavoidable.

3. I am not sure how far the paper accurately reflects the complexity of the balancing act that the King must maintain. It is a dangerous misappreciation to hint that the King has only to rely on his sterling Bedouins to knock all comers for six. Nothing could hasten his disappearance more effectively than the abandonment of his unique position in Jordan as stabilizer and chief ring holder between the multifarious factions - a point which I fear some of our American colleagues have not yet fully grasped.

Yours sincerely,
Ben Strachan
(B. L. Strachan)

C. W. Long, Esq.,
N.E.D.,
F.C.O.

Copied to Mr. Summerscale.
Cabinet Office Assessment Staff.

Re P/w a return to me
as to Mr. Long O/R.

SECRET

Mr. Long O/R.

From 18/5

I have spoken to Mr. Summerscale. He is in no
hurry to discuss the draft in the light of the
comments, until you get back. (He will himself be on leave for a
month.) From 20/5

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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Para. 4, last sentence. While I agree that the majority of East Bankers still support the King, I am not sure how far this majority could be described as retaining their "strong loyalty to the Hashemite monarchy". I suspect their loyalty is to King Hussein personally and I am by no means sure that it would be given unreservedly to other Hashemites.

2. Para. 5, third sentence. A distinction should be made between regular fedayeen (? about 15,000) who are largely dispersed for operations outside Amman, and the fedayeen "militia" in Amman (? about 25,000) whose task is to mobilize resistance to any attack on the fedayeen power base, i.e. the poorer quarters of Amman and the refugee camps.

3. Para 5, last sentence. This could be spelled out more fully. Israeli retaliation has two main effects on the local population:—

(a) They assume that the Israelis would not be retaliating violently if they had not been violently hurt. Thus the fedayeen gain in prestige and their exaggerated communiques are given credence.

(b) They blame the régime for not protecting /them

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(2)

them against Israeli reprisals, and for not avenging them: the Jordan Army's defensive posture is manifestly not exacting retribution, the fedayeen aggressive policy is. Once again, the fedayeen gain and the régime loses.

4. Para 6, fourth sentence. This is quite misleading. The King may have decided to act, but his ministers played little or no part in reaching this decision. Nor was there any decision on the King's part to act "decisively". The regulations were in effect little more than the points agreed upon after the November, 1968 confrontation. Moreover, Fatah, concerned with their image with Palestinian opinion, agreed broadly with the regulations. What was intended simply as a tightening up exercise developed into a confrontation due to inept handling:-

(a) There was no prior consultation with the fedayeen.

(b) The impression was given that this was a drive to wipe out the smaller extreme groups, after which the Army might have turned on the moderate groups.

(c) The first move of the Army was to close the road-blocks leading into Amman, thereby cutting off the regular fedayeen from their militia and power base. The fedayeen know they are intensely vulnerable when deployed in the countryside, their safety lies in "the masses" in Amman.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

5. It follows that the fifth sentence ~~is~~ also

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needs amending. The outcome of the confrontation was a "freezing" of the regulations by the régime, and the imposition of some of them by the fedayeen themselves on their own members. The agreement that further discussions should lead to full implementation of the regulations has not been pursued. So far as I am aware, Kailani's resignation was not a "quid pro quo" in this context.

6. Para. 7. This is an over-simplification of the anti-Sisco riots. It has for nine months now been standard policy for the security forces to avoid provocation of demonstrators by leaving their immediate control to the fedayeen. In the past this had worked extremely well and, since no-one was hurt in the Sisco riots, did not break down completely on this occasion. What did happen was that the fedayeen leadership failed to foresee that some of the demonstrators would ignore orders and that the fedayeen police would be as reluctant as the Security Forces to apply the ultimate sanction of shooting down popular demonstrators. Nevertheless, the last sentence of para. 7 is broadly true.

7. Para. 8. The first sentence is an understatement; the growth of the fedayeen movement derives directly from the failure to get a settlement. I doubt the second sentence: I fear that the fedayeen would violently oppose the return of the West Bank to Jordan. I would prefer the bit in parenthesis to read "(but it is becoming increasingly unlikely that he would be able to reestablish his authority over Palestinians on the West Bank)". I do not think the penultimate sentence accurately reflects the

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/feelings

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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feelings of most Palestinians towards the fedayeen. The most important point is that they identify themselves with them as "our boys" in a quite normal emotion of patriotic nationalism.

8Para. 9. May well overstate the likely loyalty of East Bankers to Prince Hassan. I understand he lacks the King's charm and flexibility.

9Para. 10. Line 1. For "better", substitute "good" or "much better". Nasser almost certainly regards Hussein, too weak to move without his support and enjoying good relations with the West, as a much more satisfactory ruler of Jordan in present circumstances, than any conceivable successor.

10Para. 11. Although this is spelled out later, it might be as well to make the point that Syrian troops in Jordan are insignificant.

11. Para. 12. It is not so much failure to reach a settlement which will drive Hussein towards Russia, as the pro-Israel posture of America and, in Arab eyes though to a lesser extent, Britain. We should not lose sight of the fact that H.M.G. still has the option, by words if not by deeds, to reduce Arab hostility and its corollary of further movement towards the Soviet Union.

12. Para. 12. Second sentence. The ~~reaction~~ of Jordan's conservative paymasters is an additional deterrent.

13. Para. 13. Whatever Israelis may say privately, it is a fact that Israeli policies and propaganda have greatly exacerbated Arab-West relations, have weakened Hussein vis à vis the fedayeen and have contributed very markedly to Israel + West v. Arabs + Soviet Union polarization. As seen

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from here, there is nothing to suggest that Israel would not welcome Hussein's disappearance and ^{the} chaos in Jordan that this might bring. It follows that it is doubtful whether Israel would intervene, should Hussein be overthrown, unless she felt it gave her a welcome excuse to launch limited operations to destroy Jordanian and fedayeen forces.

14. Para 14.

[Comment by D.A.]

Penultimate sentence. While it is true that fedayeen attacks on Eilat would provoke Israeli reprisals on Aqaba, it is doubtful whether these would be so great as to put Aqaba out of action, since to do so would be to destroy the hostage to Eilat's own security. If things escalated to this stage, it is probable that Israel would invade and hold sufficient Jordanian territory around Aqaba to prevent Jordan artillery getting within range of Eilat.

15. Para. 15. The very security of the Jordan Valley boundary works both ways: Israeli "sanitizing sweeps" could be very costly (viz Karamah) and would be largely ineffective, since the fedayeen would simply withdraw to the hills. Nor would the threat of ^{denuding} ~~bombing~~ the border area be effective, since this has already happened.

16. Para. 16a. The implication that "lawlessness" is a fedayeen objective is not true.

17. Para. 16b. Nor is the implication that there is strong East Bank-Palestinian antipathy.

18. Perhaps these two objectives could be redrafted on the following lines:-

(a) to achieve a modus vivendi with the

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/fedayeen

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fedayeen groups, whereby the latter are allowed reasonable freedom of action in return for their abstention from attempts to subvert the régime or provoking Israel to the extent that she might destroy the economic life of the East Bank.

(b) to provide a legitimate outlet for Palestinian aspirations without seriously undermining East Bank support for the régime.

19. Para. 17, line 6. After "responsibilities" insert "East Bank hostility and adverse reaction of other Arab régimes."

20. Para. 17, third sentence. I think the statement "even though the forces at his disposal were unquestionably superior to the fedayeen in Amman" needs qualification. The King must have had to consider the following factors:

(a) Fedayeen in Amman including armed civilian militia were estimated anything between 15,000 and 25,000, mostly deployed in houses and ^{on} roof-tops in densely populated quarters.

(b) Overall, fifty percent of his army is Palestinian. The fact that this proportion is undoubtedly very much smaller in his reserve division, which is earmarked for such security duties, means that more than half the personnel in the forward divisions are Palestinians. The loyalty of these, would, to say the least, have been questionable, once news reached them that Bedouin troops were attacking their families and relatives in Amman;

(c) The need to earmark sufficient forces to block any move by the Iraqi forces;

(d) Most important, the fact that Israel provides him with no alternative policy to put to his people, so that even had an attack on

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the fedayeen been successful, the situation in ^{they emerged} which ~~gave rise to them~~ would still remain - and fifty percent of the East Bank population would still be Palestinians, who might well seek vengeance by assassinating him.

20. Paras.19 and 20. The point should be made that whereas Fatah believe in the liberation of Palestine first and politics subsequently, the P.F.L.P. maintain that Palestine will never be liberated until the "reactionary régimes", including Hussein's, have been overthrown. As times goes by and Fatah fail to achieve the liberation, so increasing members of fedayeen may be attracted by the P.F.L.P. philosophy: in other words, their failure on the Israeli front may drive the fedayeen to turn inwards on the régime. This is the real danger.

21. Para. 21, first sentence. The Jordanian authorities have been trying to get Fatah to agree to this for at least a year. The King is still in touch with Arafat with this aim.

22. An additional reason why Arafat is unlikely to agree is that he has no reason to believe that, having eliminated the radical groups, the King will not subsequently try to eliminate him.

23. Para. 22, first sentence. I would put this rather differently: "The growth of fedayeen prestige and power has provided a focus for a great rebirth of Palestinian nationalism and has aggravated the Hashemite monarchy's difficulty in reconciling Palestinians to East Bank domination."

24. Penultimate sentence. For "are likely

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to find" and "are likely to increase",

substitute "are finding" and "are increasing".

25. Last sentence. For "may also spread" substitute "is spreading".

Para. 23 - last sentence. This is not true.

The King has indeed been contemplating this, but is unlikely to bring it about, not only for the reason given in the second sentence, but also because few aspiring Palestinian politicians would join the government under present circumstances.

26.

Para. 25, line 1. "Extremely remote" is much too categoric in the prevailing explosive situation. Substitute "unlikely".

27. Para. 27. The Iraqi forces would almost certainly pin down substantial Jordanian forces, preventing them joining effectively in an anti-fedayeen confrontation. Moreover the fedayeen enjoy such popular support throughout the Arab world that Iraqi intervention on their behalf would by no means necessarily bring condemnation from most Arab States.

28. But the factor which makes joint action by the fedayeen and the Iraqis unlikely, is the fact that Fatah has almost as much to fear from an Iraqi takeover as the King.

29. Para. 28. Saiqa reinforcement is continuing. Fatah is probably almost as concerned at this influx of Syrians with ulterior motives as the King is.

30.

Paras. 29 and 30. The danger of assassination would also be greatly increased subsequent to a successful but bloody confrontation with the fedayeen.

31. I fear it may be too optimistic to assume that an assassination would not lead to chaos.

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32. Para 31. The third sentence is much too catagoric. One of the strongest factors in the King's favour is that he has ruled Jordan for so long, i.e. his very familiarity. The Crown Prince enjoys no such advantage (a point made later in para. 33).

See also comments above Paras. 8 and 13.

33. Para. 32. Mention might be made of the fact that the King takes measures to prevent this by frequent changes of his military commanders. Tribal rivalries and the 50% Palestinian composition of the Army must make the durability of any junta very doubtful and it is doubtful in consequence whether the conclusion in the last sentence is justified.

34. Para. 33. The first sentence, for reasons given above, seems much too optimistic.

35. Para. 34. The last sentence is too catagoric a forecast in so turbulent a situation.

36. Para. 35. Last sentence. For "he would be faced with the problem of how" substitute "it is now doubtful whether he would be able".

Ans 15/5

PGC 15/2

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(Copied to D14, Cabinet
Office & RD)

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Mr. M. C. 19/5 (10)

Mr. M. C. 19/5
For Secretary's notes of King's
problems & in his support.
The fedayeen & Iraqi works

BRITISH EMBASSY,

Rg Entern + copy to Chancery
AMMAN. Moscow 19/5

15 May, 1970

1/1

Dear Peter,

Jordan Internal

As recorded in our telegram 180, the Jordan Foreign Minister forecast to my Ambassador that the King would probably attempt major government changes in the near future.

2. As we have pointed out before, the King is faced with an almost insoluble dilemma over this: if he picks a hard line East Bank team, he will please his loyal supporters (senior army officers, the Bedouin, and senior East Bankers), but will further estrange the Palestinians and, probably, many of the younger East Bankers. Furthermore the fedayeen would undoubtedly interpret this as a move against themselves, which would strengthen the hand of extremist groups and escalate the risk of a confrontation.

3. Conversely, were he to appoint a government of pro-fedayeen Palestinians, he would outrage precisely those elements from whose support his power derives. Furthermore, since such Palestinians are basically disloyal to the Hashemite Kingdom he cannot afford to give them real power, so any aspiring Palestinian politician must realise that by joining a government which can only be the King's stooge, he would be courting the kiss of death.

4. These considerations, are, of course, basically why the King has been obliged to continue with the discredited old sweets, the majority of whom at least have the merit that they are not demonstrably pro or anti anything (except perhaps pro-themselves). Clearly, however, he cannot continue with the present setup, if he is not to see his position progressively eroded.

5. We have some evidence that he is in fact probing in at least two directions: he is maintaining a dialogue with moderate fedayeen leaders, led by Arafat, to establish some more durable modus vivendi, and in effect to establish an alliance with them aimed at curbing the influence within the resistance movement of the left wing elements. The limitations of such a policy are that Arafat quite simply has no reason to trust the King, i.e. that if Arafat helped him to eliminate the left wingers, there is no guarantee that he might not then proceed to eliminate Arafat.

6. A second probing operation the King appears to be conducting, in considerable secrecy, is the possibility of forming a government of a combination of East Bank moderate left-wingers, principally men on friendly terms with the Syrians, and distinguished elderly Palestinians with moderate pro-fedayeen sympathies. According to

/one

J. P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Dept.,
F.C.O.

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one of the East Bankers who has been approached on this, the policy of such a government would be to recognise the P.L.O. as the current representative of the Palestinians, vis à vis Israel, and to abdicate responsibility for securing a settlement to them, à la Boumedienne. One important factor in this line of approach, quite apart from its obvious attempt to get the Palestinians off the régime's back, may well be a feeling that the advent of substantial Iraqi reinforcements to North Jordan makes it highly desirable that Syria and Jordan, to both of whom it poses a serious threat, had best try to mend their fences.

7. Alternatively, he might be trying to capitalize on local nationalist sentiment by engaging the support at once of pro-Baathi East Bankers against external Iraqi-Syrian interference, and of the Palestinian fedayeen against the current reinforcement of the A.L.F. and Saiqa by non-Palestinian Baathists.

8. The appointment of so potentially disloyal a government, which would have a serious impact on the loyalty of his traditional supporters (though this could perhaps be mitigated by a simultaneous purge of senior army officers of former Baathist sympathies), and the consequent importance of keeping the powers of such a government closely curtailed, must, however, make the whole idea a pretty doubtful starter.

9. Fortunately, in spite of - or because of - these manoeuvrings, the King has clearly not lost sight of the over-riding importance of maintaining the loyalty of his armed forces: he has devoted the past week or two almost exclusively to an extensive and well publicized tour of a large number of army units.

Yours ever,

Ben

(B. L. Strachan)

c.c. Chanceries:

Baghdad
Beirut
Tel Aviv
Cairo
Washington
UKMIS New York

CONFIDENTIAL

21 MAY 1970

Cutting dated

As Israel Bombs Egypt for Eighth Day**Jordan Re-Opens Irrigation Canal**

By Lawrence Fellows

JERUSALEM, May 20 (NYT).—Jordan has tentatively started water coursing down the East Ghor Canal, watering the parched and battle-scarred groves and fields on its side of the Jordan River.

The sluices at the head of the canal, on the Yarmuk River before it flows into the Jordan, were apparently opened last night. From high points on the Israeli-occupied West Bank of the Jordan River, the water could be seen this morning, winding through the canal and into the dusty fields that once accounted for one-fifth of Jordan's agricultural production.

Since the Israelis occupied the West Bank of the Jordan in the war in June, 1967, they have destroyed the canal several times—by artillery fire and by commando raids and, last New Year's Day, by

aerial bombardment—in reprisal actions following Jordanian artillery attacks and Arab guerrilla raids.

Diplomatic Efforts

There were fears this time that not much could be rescued of the most valuable crops in this vast complex of 30,000 irrigated acres. The citrus groves and banana plantations can last only a few weeks without irrigation.

Through the diplomatic efforts of the United States, which financed and started the irrigation scheme before the 1967 war, the canal has been repaired again in the past five weeks. Bulldozers shoved dirt back into the breaches. The ruptured concrete walls were restored.

The Israelis watched the repair work with a growing feeling of uneasiness. In the past month, the commando raids from the East Bank have been gathering momen-

tum again. When shooting broke out, sometimes the Jordanian artillery positions overlooking the Jordan and Beisan Valleys would join in the firing.

Two days ago, Israeli planes bombed Jordanian and Iraqi artillery positions on the Gilead Mountain plateau for three-and-a-half hours.

Last night, mortar shells were lobbed from Jordan into Ashdot Yaakov, a settlement south of the Sea of Galilee, on the Israeli side of the Yarmuk.

Again last night, three guerrillas from Jordan set up an ambush in the bullrushes nearby. They fired a bazooka shell at a passing Israeli patrol, and missed. The Israeli soldiers called up reinforcements and eventually the three commandos were killed.

Today, there were complaints from Ashdot Yaakov that the level of the Yarmuk River had dropped nearly two feet since the Jordanians started the flow of water into the East Ghor Canal. Ashdot Yaakov takes its water directly from the Yarmuk and its pumps were left high and dry.

Eighth Straight Day

TEL AVIV, May 20 (UPI).—Israeli jets raided Egypt's Suez Canal front lines today for the eighth straight day in an offensive to smash massed artillery and keep Egyptian forward air defenses permanently shattered.

The jets attacked military targets along the waterway's central sector for 90 minutes this morning, a military spokesman said. All returned safely, he said.

The purpose of the continuing heavy air strikes is to reduce Israeli ground casualties by destroying Egypt's artillery concentrations and to prevent the reconstruction of previously destroyed anti-aircraft systems, a senior military officer said yesterday.

Egyptian fire in cross-canal duels wounded two Israeli soldiers at midday, a spokesman said.


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Pl. copy to Mr A.S. Fair,
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Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

3 June, 1970

(NEJ.1/4)

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The Outlook for Jordan


Thank you very much for your letter of 15 May and for your comments on Peter Summerscale's draft paper. We are particularly grateful to you for producing them so rapidly, and I should like to apologise for giving you such very short notice. I am even more sorry for putting you to the inconvenience because the machine, as it sometimes does, has hiccoughed, and we may now not after all be able to get the paper into final form as quickly as we had wished.

2. It was very useful to have your comments on the complex balancing act which King Hussein maintains so remarkably. You dealt with the subject in more detail in your letter 1/1 of 15 May to Peter Tripp, which we found gave a most interesting insight into the King's problems vis-à-vis the three power groups represented by his supporters, the fedayeen and the foreign troops in his country. We have sent copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Moscow and Paris.

(C. W. Long)

B. L. Strachan Esq.,
AMMAN

SECRET



Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

3 June, 1970

(NEJ.1/4)

The Outlook for Jordan

Thank you very much for your letter of 15 May and for your comments on Peter Summerscale's draft paper. We are particularly grateful to you for producing them so rapidly, and I should like to apologise for giving you such very short notice. I am even more sorry for putting you to the inconvenience because the machine, as it sometimes does, has hiccoughed, and we may now not after all be able to get the paper into final form as quickly as we had wished.

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(C. W. Long)

B. L. Strachan Esq.,
AMMAN

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CYPHER CAT A
PRIORITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 196

TO PORTUGAL AND CALCUTTA/TEL CUNTO
15 MAY 1970.

RESTRICTED.

Pr
8/6

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 196 DATED 15 MAY 70 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO DEFUT CAIRO TEL AVIV AND JIS(NE)

DEMONSTRATION IN AMMAN.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO. 10
NET 1/4

A LARGE DEMONSTRATION TO MARK THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE DIVISION OF
PALESTINE IN 1948 TOOK PLACE IN AMMAN THIS MORNING.
IT WAS VERY EFFICIENTLY ORGANISED BY FATAH, AND CONSISTED OF
A PROCESSION LED BY ABOUT 500 ARMED AND UNIFORMED FEDAYEEN
FOLLOWED BY A CROWD OF AT LEAST 10,000 CONSISTING OF SCHOOL
CHILDREN REPRESENTATIVES OF TRADE UNIONS AND PROFESSIONAL
ORGANISATIONS, AND OTHER SUPPORTERS. THE DEMONSTRATORS CARRIED
BANNERS, ONE OR TWO OF WHICH HAD ANTI-BRITISH SLOGANS.
THEY PROCEEDED TO THE ROMAN AMPHITHEATRE FOR A POPULAR RALLY
AND THEN DISPERSED QUIETLY. ALTHOUGH THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES
TOOK CONSIDERABLE PRECAUTIONS, THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION OF VIOLENCE
AND FATAH KEPT THE DEMONSTRATION FIRMLY UNDER CONTROL. THIS WAS
AN IMPRESSIVE AFFAIR, AND FORMED A STRIKING CONTRAST TO THE SMALL
AND NOISY DEMONSTRATION BY THE POPULAR FRONT ON 1 MAY.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO JIS(NE)

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN

AIR P. AD HC

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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R E S T R I C T E D

GGGGG

EN CLAIR
TIME AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 199

TO F C O
18 MAY 1970.

UNCLASSIFIED.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 199 DATED 18 MAY 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD AND NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM 196 (NOT TO ALL) MAY 15 DEMONSTRATION.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AT THE
POPULAR RALLY HELD AFTER THE DEMONSTRATION IN AMMAN ON 15 MAY.

RECEIVED AT
CITY NO. 10
NEJIL

1. ALL THE MASSES OF OUR JORDANIAN - PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ANNOUNCE
THEIR COMPLETE SUPPORT FOR THE STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO
CONSOLIDATE AND STRENGTHEN THE UNITY OF ALL NATIONAL FIGHTING
FORCES THROUGH THE AGREEMENT WHICH WAS CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE
RESISTANCE GROUPS AND WHICH REPRESENTS A STEP FORWARD ON THE
ROAD TO BUILDING A UNIFIED NATIONAL FRONT COMMITTED TO A NATIONAL
REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMME THROUGH THE ACHIEVEMENT OF COMPLETE LIBER-
ATION. OUR MASSES CALL UPON ALL NATIONAL ORGANISATIONS TO
PROTECT THIS UNITY TO BALANCE ALL INTERNAL OBSTACLES TO WHICH
THEY MAY BE EXPOSED.
2. ALL THE MASSES OF OUR PEOPLE CONSIDER THE UNITY OF THE JORDANIAN
-PALESTINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT TO BE THEIR HIGHEST AND MOST HOLY
DEMAND AND REJECTS ALL ATTEMPTS TO DESTROY THIS UNITY. OUR
PALESTINIAN - JORDANIAN NATIONAL STRUGGLE IS ONE INDIVISIBLE
STRUGGLE TO REALISE THE INTERESTS OF THE MASSES REGARDING THEIR
LIVELIHOOD. THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A JORDANIAN ON ONE HAND
AND A PALESTINIAN ON THE OTHER.
3. THE MASSES OF OUR PEOPLE OBJECT TO ALL ATTEMPTS TO RESTRAIN
ARMED RESISTANCE. THEREFORE, ALL THE MASSES REJECT ALL ATTEMPTS
AT ENCLOSURE OR CONTAINMENT OF THE RESISTANCE OR TO IMPOSE
GUARDIANSHIP UPON IT. THEY CONSIDER THAT ALL THE GAINS WHICH
HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED AND STRENGTHENED BY BLOOD CANNOT BE
FORGOTTEN BECAUSE THE RESISTANCE DERIVES ITS AUTHORITY FROM THE
MASSSES OF THE PEOPLE. THE MASSES OF OUR PEOPLE AFFIRM THAT ALL
ARAB AND PALESTINIAN LAND MUST BE AN OPEN AREA FOR THE REVOLUTION-
ARY STRUGGLE OF THE RESISTANCE.

4. THE MASSES OF OUR PEOPLE AFFIRM THAT THEY CLING TO THE GAINS WHICH THEY HAVE ACQUIRED THROUGH THEIR LONG STRUGGLE AND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE MADE EVERY SACRIFICE. THE MASSES AFFIRM THEIR RIGHT TO ORGANISE, TO TRAIN AND TO ARM AND TO EXTENSIVE POLITICAL ACTION.

5. THE MASSES OF OUR PEOPLE REAFFIRM THE SOLIDARITY OF THEIR STRUGGLE WITH THE STRUGGLE OF ALL THE ARAB MASSES FOR LIBERATION, MILITARILY, ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY. THE ARAB MASSES CALL FOR STRUGGLE TO PROTECT THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT.

6. THE MASSES OF OUR PEOPLE REAFFIRM THEIR REJECTION OF ALL LIQUIDATORY OR CAPITULATIONIST SOLUTIONS, ESPECIALLY THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

7. THE MASSES OF OUR PEOPLE CONSIDER THEIR NATIONAL STRUGGLE TO BE AN INDIVISIBLE PART OF THE MOVEMENT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION IN THE WORLD.

8. THE MASSES OF OUR PEOPLE FEEL PRIDE IN THE HEROISM SHOWN BY THE FIDAYEEN IN SOUTH LEBANON. LONG LIVE THE GREAT STRUGGLE OF THE LEBANESE MASSES AND ITS UNITY WITH THE STRUGGLE OF THE PALESTINIAN MASSES.

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO NEW YORK

SIR P ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER CAT/A

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PRIORITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 200

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
20 MAY 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL.

RECEIVED IN

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 200 DATED 20 MAY 70 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION ROUTINE TO LEISUT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD,
AND URMIS NEW YORK.

(2)

MY TEL NO 199: MAY 15 DEMONSTRATION.

THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE POPULAR RALLY ON 15 MAY FOLLOW
THE GENERAL LINES OF THE STATEMENT PUT OUT BY THE UNIFIED COMMAND
ON 6 MAY (TEXT IN LUSH'S LETTER TO EVANS OF 15 MAY).

THERE IS, HOWEVER, MORE EMPHASIS ON THE UNITY AND INDIVISIBILITY
OF THE JORDANIAN - PALESTINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT - ONE RESOLUTION
SAYS SPECIFICALLY THAT THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A JORDANIAN
AS OPPOSED TO A PALESTINIAN.

2. THE FEDAYEEN HAVE ALWAYS BEEN CONSCIOUS OF THE VALUE OF
WINNING SUPPORT AMONGST EAST BANKERS, PARTICULARLY THE WORKING
CLASS, AND THIS IS NO DOUBT ONE MOTIVE BEHIND THE LINE NOW BEING
TAKEN. THE MORE SUCCESSFUL THEY ARE IN THIS, THE MORE EASILY
CAN THEY OPERATE FROM AND TRAIN IN JORDAN, AND BY THUS ERODING
THE KING'S POSITION, REDUCE THE CHANCES OF HIS RISKING A
CONFRONTATION WITH THEM. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT FATAH SEE
THE APPEAL TO JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN PATRIOTISM AS A MEANS OF
COUNTERING THE CONTINUING REINFORCEMENT OF SAJQA GROUP AND
A.L.F. WITH NON-PALESTINIAN SUBVERSIVES.

3. WHILE IN THE LONG TERM, SOME AT LEAST OF THE FEDAYEEN LEADERS
ENVISAGE A "GREATER PALESTINE" INCLUDING OR IN FEDERATION WITH
THE EAST BANK OF THE JORDAN, THE EMPHASIS ON THE UNITY OF
JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS SEEMS MORE LIKELY TO BE CONCERNED
WITH THE IMMEDIATE AIMS OF MAKING THE JORDAN BASE SECURE AND
REDUCING SYRIAN AND IRAQI POWER IN THE MOVEMENT.

F.C.O. PASS ROUTINE TO NEW YORK.

SIR P. ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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OTI-AM/AMM.A

TEL AMMAN AMMAN

TELNO.FOH 081115Z

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (U.K.)

JUNE, 1970

Pin
9/6

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO MOD DIA TELEGRAM NO FOH 081115Z JUNE AND TO
FCO AND HQBFNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO JIS(NE)
BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV AND BACHDAD.

FROM DA AMMAN

JORDAN ARMY AND FEDAYEEN CLASHES.

✓
C. N. Y. No. 10
NE 3 1/4

A SPOKESMAN OF THE JORDAN ARMED FORCES CHQ GAVE DA THIS MORNING
IN CONFIDENCE, AN ACCOUNT OF THE CLASHES BETWEEN THE JORDAN
ARMY AND FEDAYEEN ON 6 AND 7 JUNE.

2. FIRST INCIDENT OCCURRED ABOUT 1500Z ON 6 JUNE, IN AMMAN,
NEAR AL HUSSEIN MOSQUE. HERE A UNIFORMED AND ARMED MEMBER
OF THE JORDAN ARMY'S SPECIAL FORCES WAS SEVERELY BEATEN UP BY
TWO FEDAYEEN WHEN HE REFUSED TO SHOW HIS IDENTITY CARD AND
GIVE UP HIS WEAPON. THE SOLDIER WAS WOUNDED IN THE SCUFFLE.
PALESTINE ARMED STRUGGLE COMMAND MILITARY POLICE THEN ARRIVED,
STOPPED THE FIGHTING AND TOOK THE SOLDIER TO HOSPITAL. SUBSEQUENT
TO THIS INCIDENT TENSION ROSE IN THE TOWN AND MANY FEDAYEEN VEHICLES
LOVED AROUND AND ARMED FEDAYEEN APPEARED IN THE STREETS,
SPOKESMAN SAYS THAT THESE WERE FORCES OF THE SYRIAN BACKED
SAFIQA GROUP. DURING NIGHT 7/8 JUNE THERE WAS MUCH SMALL ARMS
FIRING IN AMMAN BUT NO CASUALTIES ARE REPORTED.

3. SECOND INCIDENT STARTED IN ZERQA AT ABOUT 1400Z ON 7 JUNE.
FEDAYEEN, ALLEGED TO BE FROM SAFIQA, STARTED FIGHTING ON SOLDIERS
MOVING AROUND IN THIS GARRISON TOWN, IN THE ZERQA CAMP AREA,
AND IN THE JORDAN ARMY SPECIAL FORCES CAMP. THE SPECIAL FORCES
CAMP ADJOINS A REFUGEE CAMP AND THE EXCHANGE OF AUTOMATIC FIRE
WAS HEAVY. CASUALTIES REPORTED SO FAR ARE EIGHT KILLED, ONE
SOLDIER LT. LY SLEPT IN ZERQA CAMP, AND SEVEN FEDAYEEN/CIVILIANS.
F TOTAL FIFTYEIGHT WOUNDED, ONE SPECIAL FORCES SOLDIER IN THEIR

/GDP

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CAMP, ABOUT FOUR IRAQIS AND TWELVE JORDANIAN SOLDIERS IN ZERQA TOWN, AND REMAINDER FEDAYEEN/CIVILIANS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PFLP GROUP ALSO TOOK PART IN THIS INCIDENT. ROADS IN SOME PARTS OF ZERQA TOWN WERE BLOCKED. INCIDENT ENDED UNDER ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY PASC FESCES. NO ARMY UNIT WAS TURNED OUT TO DEAL WITH THIS TROUBLE. SPOKESMAN SAID THAT NON USE OF ARMY FORCES WAS DELIBERATE SO THAT SITUATION WOULD NOT ESCALATE.

COMMENT: THE ZERQA INCIDENT WAS PROBABLY PROVOKED BY ACCOUNTS OF THE AMMAN FRACAS. JORDAN SPECIAL FORCES HAVE BEEN GIVEN AUTHORITY BY KING HUSSEIN, AS HARK OF SPECIAL CONFIDENCE, TO CARRY ARMS AT ALL TIMES AND TOLD NOT TO ACCEPT ABUSE FROM FEDAYEEN. GIVEN THE QUANTITY OF ARMS NOW CARRIED IN THE STREETS, INCIDENTS OF THIS KIND ARE VIRTUALLY INEVITABLE.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO DIA, HQEFNE AND JIS(NE)

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCONCEN

SIR P. ADAMS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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CYBER CAT A
FLASH AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 229

TO F.C.O.
9 JUNE 1970.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 10

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FLASH FCO TELEGRAM NO 229 DATED 9 JUNE AND TO NEJ 1/4
MOD DIA. REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE HQBFNE CAIRO
DEIRUT TEL AVIV BAGHDAD WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND JISNE.

pr
9/6

JORDAN:- INTERNAL SITUATION:

HEAVY AND WIDESPREAD FIGHTING BETWEEN PARTIES OF FEDAYEEN AND
REGULAR TROOPS BROKE OUT IN THE EARLY HOURS OF THIS MORNING
AND IS STILL CONTINUING.

MOST OFFICES AND SHOPS IN THE TOWN ARE CLOSED AND THERE IS
LITTLE MOVEMENT. WE HAVE SEEN NO SIGN OF TROOPS IN THE CENTRE
OF THE TOWN, WHERE THE FEDAYEEN HAVE BEEN LEFT TO DO AS THEY
PLEASE.

2. WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH THE BRITISH COMMUNITY AND HAVE ADVISED
THEM TO STAY IN THEIR HOUSES. WHILE THIS IS THEIR BEST CHANCE
OF SAFETY, FIRING IS GENERAL AND INDISCRIMINATE, AND WE CANNOT
EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF CASUALTIES

DEFCONCEN PASS FLASH TO MOD DIA AND IMMEDIATE TO HQBFNE AND JISNE.

FCO PASS FLASH TO DEFCONCEN AND IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND NEWYORK

SIR P ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].
[SENT TO D.C.C.].

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FLASH AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 230

9 JUNE 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED FLASH TO FCO TELEGRAM NO. 230 DATED 9 JUNE 1970 AND

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10/6

FLASH TO MOD DIA REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE HQBFNE,
JIS(NE), JIS GULF, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, WASHINGTON,
AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

f (17)

MY TEL NO 229. JORDAN INTERNAL SITUATION.

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HEAVY AND INTERMITTENT FIRING OF SMALL ARMS IN THE NORTH WEST
SUBURBS OF AMMAN STARTED AT ABOUT 0100Z AROUND GHQ JORDAN ARMED
FORCES AND THE GENERAL INTELLIGENCE HQ, WHERE, IT IS RUMOURED,
FEDAYEEN CAPTURED DURING LAST WEEK END'S CLASH WERE HELD.
THE SOUND OF FIRING LATER MOVED TO THE NORTH AND EAST AREAS OF
THE TOWN. SEVERAL LOUD EXPLOSIONS RESEMBLING PORTARS AND
POSSIBLY 76 MM SALADINS WERE HEARD. FEDAYEEN WERE SEEN FROM
THIS EMBASSY FIRING A HEAVY MACHINE GUN INTO THE TOWN AND ALL
AROUND THE EMBASSY FIRE ARMS WERE FIRED INDISCRIMINATELY.

2. MAJOR F.J. GODDARD, AMA, WHILST OBSERVING FROM A COVERED
POSITION ON THE EMBASSY ROOF WAS HIT BY A SPLINTER IN THE BACK
BUT FORTUNATELY WOUND IS SUPERFICIAL AND OFFICER REMAINS AT
DUTY, HAVING BEEN SEEN BY DOCTOR. NO NOTIFICATION NECESSARY.

3. NO MILITARY HAVE BEEN SEEN OPERATING IN JEBEL AMMAN NEAR
THIS EMBASSY BUT THERE ARE REPORTS THAT ARMY HAS BEEN IN
OPERATION IN NORTH AND EAST AMMAN. ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT CONFIRM THIS.

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4. AMMAN RADIO HAS ANNOUNCED THAT A CEASE-FIRE HAS BEEN AGREED WITH EFFECT FROM 1230Z. CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE FEDAYEEN ARE NOW TAKING PLACE. IT APPEARS THAT ALL RESISTANCE GROUPS (NOT ONLY PFLP, AS EARLIER SEEMED LIKELY) WERE INVOLVED IN THIS MORNING'S CONFRONTATION.

DEFCONCEN PASS FLASH TO DIA, IMMEDIATE TO JIS(NE), JIS GULF, HQBFNE.

FCO PASS FLASH TO DEFCONCEN AND IMMEDIATE TO UKHIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

SIR P. ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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FLASH AMMAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

RECEIVED 232 9 JUNE 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FLASH FCO TELEGRAM NO 222 DATED 9 JUNE 1970 AND TO


FLASH JED DIA, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO HOMER? JIS(NE),

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JIS GULF, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT? WASHINGTON? DENIS N.Y.

8 (19)

NY TEL NO 230: JORDAN INTERNAL SITUATION.



THE CEASE FIRE HAS APPARENTLY BEEN PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE IN SOME

OUTLYING AREAS BUT NOT IN THE CENTRE OF AMMAN OR THE AREAS OF

GREATEST TENSION THIS MORNING. FIRING CONTINUES TO BE FAIRLY

HEAVY AND MOVEMENT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE ALTHOUGH NO CURFEW

HAS BEEN IMPOSED. THE AIRPORT IS CLOSED.

2. I UNDERSTAND THAT KING HUSSEIN'S HOUSE AT HUNJAR CAME UNDER

FIRE AND A GOVERNMENT STATEMENT REFERS TO AN INCIDENT IN WHICH

HIS BODYGUARD WAS INTERCEPTED. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS ALSO ISSUED

/A STATEMENT

ASSASSINATION. STATEMENTS THAT C-IN-C SHERIF NASSER WAS KILLED
HAVE BEEN DENIED OFFICIALLY.

3. JOINT ARMY/FEDAYEEN PATROLS ARE CIRCULATING IN A FRESH
ATTEMPT TO PUBLICISE AND GET COOPERATION WITH THE CEASE FIRE.
I AM TOLD THAT THE IRAQIS ARE ALSO TRYING TO MEDIATE BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT AND FEDAYEEN.

4. NO INCIDENTS INVOLVING BRITISH LIVES OR PROPERTY HAVE BEEN
REPORTED.

DEFCONCEN PASS FLASH TO MOD DIA AND PRIORITY TO HQSNE, JIS(NE),
AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND UNHQS N.Y.

SIR P. ADAMS

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 142

TO AMMAN

10 JUNE 1970

(N.E.D.)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 142 OF 10 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT AND URMIS NEW YORK.

f (21)

Pr
12/6

YOUR TEL. NO. 233: DETAINEES.

THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR INFORMED US LATE ON TUESDAY NIGHT THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM BONN TO PROPOSE THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD CONCERT MEASURES TO OBTAIN SAFE RELEASE OF DETAINEES. HE COULD ADD NO FURTHER INFORMATION TO THAT IN YOUR PARA 1. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON WILL MAKE A SIMILAR APPROACH TO THE AMERICANS. WE EXPLAINED THAT YOU HAD ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE JORDANIAN CHIEF OF STAFF AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER WHO HAD GIVEN THE ASSURANCES IN YOUR PARA 2.

2. UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION, PLEASE CONCERT WITH YOUR GERMAN AND IF SUITABLE AMERICAN COLLEAGUE, TO MAKE WHATEVER FURTHER REPRESENTATIONS YOU CONSIDER USEFUL IN ORDER TO SECURE THE EARLY RELEASE OF THE DETAINEES, HAVING FULL REGARD TO THE OVERRIDING NEED TO ENSURE THEIR SAFETY.

3. YOU WILL NO DOUBT LET US HAVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE NAMES OF THE DETAINEES UNLESS YOUR EFFORTS TO SECURE THEIR RELEASE MAKES THIS UNNECESSARY.

STEWART

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JIS (NE)

JIF (GULF)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 11 JUN 1970 NE J114
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IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELECOM NO 132
CLASSIFIED.

TO F.C.O.
10 JUL 1974

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For Com

12/6

ADDRESSED TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELECOM NO 132 DATED 10 JUNE REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO MOD D14 AND PRIORITY TO HQBFNE, JIS (NE),
JIS GULF, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BAGDAD, BRUT, WASHINGTON, AND
UKHIS NEW YORK.

M.I.P.T. JORDAN INTERNAL SITUATION.

YASSIR ARAFAT RETURNED TO AMMAN YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND MET
WITH KING HUSSEIN AND JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN THE EVENING.
IT IS REPORTED THAT A NEW MODUS VIVENDI WAS WORKED OUT AT THIS
MEETING AND THAT BOTH SIDES AGREED TO ACCEPT AN IMMEDIATE CEASE FIRE.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT PATROLS, THE PUNISHMENT OF OFFENDERS
AND THE RELEASE OF DETAINEES.

2. SPORADIC FIRING HOWEVER CONTINUES AND AMERICAN ASSISTANT
MILITARY ATTACHE WAS SHOT DEAD NEAR HIS HOUSE (WHICH IS IN THE
AREA OF THE PASC HEADQUARTERS) THIS MORNING.
THE TROUBLE IS BY NO MEANS OVER ALTHOUGH PARTS OF THE TOWN ARE
QUIETER AND IN SOME OF THEM TRAFFIC IS MOVING AGAIN.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD D14 AND PRIORITY TO HQBFNE JIS(NE)
JIS GULF

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON AND UKHIS NEW YORK

SIR P ADAMS

[PASSED TO M.O.D.]
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 243

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

10 JUNE 1970

(25)

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ADDRESSED TO FCG TELEGRAM NO 243 DATED 10 JUNE 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO DETROIT AND ROUTINE TO CAIRO TEL AVIV
WASHINGTON AND BAGHDAD.

H.I.P.T.

JORDAN INTERNAL SITUATION.

P. C. W. 12/6

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN KING HUSSEIN AND FEDAYEEN.

1. COMPLETE ADHERENCE TO THE CEASE-FIRE.

2. MAKING SINCERE JOINT EFFORTS AND RESTORING LIFE TO NORMAL,
AND ENSURING TRANQUILLITY.

3. RETURN OF ALL REGULAR AND COMMANDO FORCES TO THEIR BASES
AND POSITIONS.

4. JOINT PATROLS WILL SUPERVISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-
FIRE AND THE GUARANTEE OF TRANQUILLITY AND ORDER.

5. RETURN OF THE JOINT GROUPS TO THE EXERCISE OF THEIR FORMER
DUTIES.

6. RELEASE OF THOSE DETAINED ON BOTH SIDES AS A RESULT OF RECENT
INCIDENTS.

7. FORMATION OF A JOINT COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY IN ORDER TO
ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF THOSE WHO CAUSED THE INCIDENTS.
THIS COMMITTEE WILL SUBMIT THE RESULTS OF ITS INVESTIGATIONS TO
HIS MAJESTY THE KING SO THAT SEVERE MEASURES MAY BE TAKEN AGAINST
THEM.

8. WORKING SINCERELY FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF NATIONAL UNITY
AMONG THE PEOPLE AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE TIES OF BROTHERHOOD
AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT,
SO THAT THEY CAN DISCHARGE THEIR SACRED DUTY IN THE BATTLE OF
LIBERATION.

9. SETTING UP OF A JOINT COMMITTEE TO WORK FOR AVOIDING ANYTHING
WHICH MAY DISTURB ORDER AND CREATE DIFFICULTIES.

LAST REF.	/10.
NEXT REF.	

10. CO-OPERATING IN RESTRAINING THE ELEMENTS WHICH TRY TO CAUSE
DISSENSION AND ESTRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE BRETHREN IN ARMS.

11. THIS STATEMENT WILL BE MADE PUBLIC.

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON

SIR P. ADAMS

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CYPHER CAT A
IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 245

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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
10 JUNE 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 245 DATED 10 JUNE REPEATED FOR 12/6
INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE MOD D14 JIS(NE) HQBFNE JIS GULF
CAIRO TEL AVIV BAGHDAD BEIRUT WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

f (24)

MY TEL NO 239: JORDAN INTERNAL SITUATION

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 11 JUN 1970 NE J114
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SPORADIC FIRING HAS CONTINUED DURING THE DAY AND THIS
AFTERNOON WAS VERY HEAVY NEAR THE RADIO STATION, SOME 3 MILES
SOUTH OF THE TOWN. IT APPEARS THAT ARMY AA GUNS SITED THERE
WERE BEING USED AGAINST ATTACKING FEDAYEEN.

2. THE PFLP HAVE TAKEN CONTROL OF THE PHILADELPHIA AND
GRANADA HOTELS (IN ADDITION TO THE INTERCONTINENTAL) AND ARE
HOLDING FOREIGN HOSTAGES. FEDAYEEN ARE REPUTED ALSO TO HAVE
TAKEN OVER A NUMBER OF SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC BUILDINGS INCLUDING
MINISTRIES OF AGRICULTURE AND EDUCATION.

3. JOINT ARMY / PASC CONTROLS ARE ONCE MORE CIRCULATING
AND PROCLAIMING THAT THE CRISIS IS RESOLVED. BUT THE GENERAL
SITUATION IS NOT REASSURING AND MAY BE DETERIORATING. I HAVE
OF COURSE THE POSSIBLE NEED FOR EVACUATING OF BRITISH SUBJECTS
IN MIND. AT THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHICH
WAY THE WIND IS BLOWING AND IN ANY CASE IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE
TO ASSEMBLE PEOPLE AND GET THEM TO THE AIRPORT.
DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD D14 JIS(NE)
HQBFNE AND JIS GULF

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCONCEN WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

SIR P ADAMS

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO MOD DI 4

TELEGRAM NO FOH 101750Z

JUNE 1970

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ADDRESSED TO DI 4 TELEGRAM NO FOH 101750Z DATED JUNE AND
TO FCO REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO JIS(NE) JIS GULF HQBFNE
CAIRO BEIRUT TEL AVIV BAGHDAD WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

FROM DA AMMAN

JORDAN INTERNAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 11 JUN 1970 NE J 14
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THE NIGHT OF 9/10 JUN WAS A QUIET NIGHT WITH NO FIRING. AT
ABOUT 0630Z TODAY FIRING BROKE OUT IN AREA OF PASC HQ, IN
NORTH WEST SUBURBS OF AMMAN. THIS CONTINUED FOR ABOUT TWO HOURS.
DURING THIS TIME ACTION AROUND PASC HQ WAS OBSERVED BY TWO MEMBERS
OF THE EMBASSY STAFF FROM THE DISTANCE OF THREE HUNDRED YARDS.
THE US AMA'S HOUSE WAS ATTACKED BY FEDAYEEN AND OUR OBSERVERS SAW
SMOKE COMING FROM THE HOUSE AND GARAGE AND HEARD AN EXPLOSION.
OUR OBSERVERS WERE ABLE TO INFORM THE QIADA AND US EMBASSY OF THIS
ATTACK AND ASKED IF HELP COULD BE SENT. IT WAS LATER LEARNED
THAT THE US AMA HAD BEEN KILLED. DURING THE REST OF THE DAY
THERE WAS SPORADIC FIRING IN THE AREA OF PASC HQ AND JEBEL AMMAN.
HEAVIER EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD TOWARDS THE AIRPORT IN EASTERN
AMMAN. AT ABOUT 1330Z HEAVY FIRING WAS HEARD AND SMOKE WAS
SEEN FROM THE AREA OF THE TV AND RADIO STATION, SOME THREE MILES
SOUTH OF AMMAN. A RELIABLE MILITARY EYE WITNESS STATED THAT IT
LOOKED AS THOUGH THE RADIO STATION WAS UNDER ATTACK THAT
THE JORDAN ARMY WAS USING M42S AND OTHER HEAVY WEAPONS. FIRING
WAS HEARD FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR. SEE CHANCERY TELS REPEATED TO YOU
ABOUT FURTHER FEDAYEEN ACTION IN AMMAN.

2. FROM ABOUT 1400Z JORDAN ARMY MILITARY POLICE LANDROVERS,
PLA POLICE LANDROVERS AND CIVILIAN POLICE CARS ASSEMBLED
OUTSIDE PASC HQ PREPARATORY TO MAKING JOINT PATROLS.

LAST REF.	
NEXT REF.	

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THESE PATROLS TOURED AMMAN BROADCASTING STATEMENTS IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE TENSION. THE SITUATION AT LAST LIGHT ON 10 JUN IS THAT ALTHOUGH SOME FIRING CAN BE HEARD FROM THE OUTSKIRTS OF AMMAN, THE CEASE FIRE IN THE WESTERN SUBURBS SEEMS TO BE GENERALLY EFFECTIVE, AS WAS THE SITUATION LAST NIGHT. SNIPERS ARE KNOWN TO BE ACTIVE AND HAVE FIRED AT THIS EMBASSY.

DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO DI4 HQBFNE, JIS(NE), JIS GULF.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCOMCEN, WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK

SIR P. ADAMS [REPEATED AS REQUESTED] [SENT TO D.C.C.]

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